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Jennifer Henderson
recover v. I. trans. l.a. To get ( occasionally, to
take) back again into one's hands or possession; to
regain possession of (something lost or taken
away). b. To regain (country, territory, etc.) by
conquest or main force; to win back (ground lost
in fighting).
If life is a bowl of cherries, why does it seem that "third wave"
feminism has congealed around a politics of empathy, with healing
and the prevention of individual trauma taking over as the central
projects?! That is admittedly an oversimplification for the sake of a
turn of phrase; however, there is a disturbing grain of accuracy in those
popular representations which cast feminism as a single-issue
movement, picking up on the central place of "violation," "raw
experience," and "authentic voices" in the currently louder strains of
the discourse. Now that "feminism" makes regular appearances in the
popular media, we need to account for those mirror-effects which do
not simply return a false image but enter into the realm of feminist
explanation as they explain feminism. Feminist identity was the
"paranormal" subject of a recent episode of The Outer Limits, in which a
sexually assaulted girl turned feminist science professor discovers a
method of travelling backwards in time (using the "pretemporal lobes"
of aborted fretuses) in order to slay the men who are destined to
become the rapists of the future. The path from raped girl to righteous
feminist serial killer is as natural and inevitable in this story as the
connection between the project of feminism and the fantasy of time
travel. This is because, outside of this particular text, sexual violation
has already, and widely, been assigned the singular status of an
absolutely determining event. The Outer Limits can thus imagine the
ultimate feminist project as an alteration of the past, a return to
confront the violator on the verge of acting, with a phrase from the
future: "You stole my life!" Such tv feminism provides a sympathetic
but pathologizing narrativization of the feminist subject position as a
stamp of personal trauma. The mutilated and obsessed time-traveller
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may be the subject of"authenticity" but her quest has nothing to do
with a larger analysis of systemic, routine violences. As the conclusion
to this episode of The Outer Limits indicates, the quest will simply be
passed on from one damaged avenger to another.
As a representation of feminism, the Outer Limits narrative is no
more ahistorical and caricaturizing than those profferred by writers
such as Camille Paglia and Canada's own Donna Laframboise, who
dismiss so-called "victim feminism" in attempts to win the speaking
positions of the "radical" and the "reasonable" respectively. Far riskier
is the question, How do we oppose that in which we are implicated?-
the sort of immanent critique, without disidentification from a feminist
"we," which would trouble the therapeutic inclination of recent
feminist discourse on power and violence. It is risky because, for the
audience of the feminist-identified critic, even the suggestion that other
forms of knowledge need to be brought to bear upon these questions
may seem to be a dangerous undercutting of the political value of brave
speech acts. But to leave the critique of the poverty of certain feminist
knowledge forms to those who position themselves as "postfeminists"
is to miss an opportunity to find new critical ground for feminism. One
kind of critique which returns to feminism the possibility of enduring
as a "political front that causes 'trouble' culturally" is the genealogical
one: in a recent essay in differences, for example, Pamela Haag
undertakes a genealogy of second-wave American feminism in an
attempt to recover some of 1960s feminism's "violent flamboyance"
(62,42). In this earlier, militant feminist strain-which learned lessons
from the new left and black power-violence, instead of being reduced
to a singular, sacralized act of "violation," was understood in relation
to a pervasive dehumanization. What is important to retrieve from this
earlier feminist politics, Haag suggests, is its analysis of an order of
violence which includes the constitutive alienations of a system of
sexual difference. From this perspective, the female subject is fractured
and mutilated prior to any act of violation, which act is then only ever a
reiteration of the always anterior, alienating, constitutive violence of
gendering. As a reiteration, a redundancy, violence is not the opposite
of non-violence and neither does it belong to those who "have power":
it can have a transformative value, can be enlisted as a part of a
"process of 'becoming' through learning'effective,' insurrectionary"
habits (41). Militant feminism valued physical force as a technique of
self-transformation, a means for women to reintegrate their fractured
selves: self-defense training, for instance, promised to be a means of
embodying political will and inscribing anger "into the muscles" (36).
Haag argues that this earlier vision has been displaced by an anti-
violation politics of confessing/reporting, empathetic listening and
advocacy, which mobilizes around the figure of the essentially
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vulnerable woman, instead of the guerilla in potentia. While the Outer
Limits episode does give us the picture of a woman deploying violence
(after all, she travels back in time with a gun in order to exterminate
rapists-in-the-making), it is not very difficult to see that her actions are
proposed as the pathological re-actions of a victim. Xena's display of
fighting skill is a better reminder of the momentary, exhilirating sense
of physical agency I experienced with the surprising realization that
my hand had smashed through a piece of wood in an early 1980s self-
defence class in Montreal, taught by feminists of the 1960s. 50 are those
lines on the last page of Gail 5cott's novel, Main Brides, which imagine a
collective gesture of self-defence in the after-math of the Ecole
polytechnique: "c. leans over and takes something gleaming from her
boot. Kicking back her chair, with an impatient flick of her foot. Like
Lydia, now, in the bar. Nous autres, nous continuerons avivre" (230).
c. To get back, regain (some non-material thing
which may be spoken of as lost or taken away). d.
To find again, come upon a second time. 2. To
regain, acquire again, resume, return to: a. a
quality, state, or condition; b. health or strength;
c. a faculty of body or mind.
The fracturing of the self which the louder strains of "third wave"
feminism tend to ascribe to a single event of violation, an invasion of
psychic and physical space which mutilates a previously coherent and
unified self, might be differently understood as the effect of earlier, or
more diffuse, processes of subjectification through which one is "made
up" as subject. The idea of an inescapable, constitutive violence at the
heart of subjectivity is developed in various ways in poststructuralist
theories of subject-formation, often in an argument with ego-
psychology's prescription of a normative unity which, these theorists
point out, can only be maintained in a relation to social"others" who
carry the displaced burden of fragmentation. From this perspective,
not only is the recovery of a lost wholeness which is held out by many
healing programmes primarily defensive but the promise itself is
downright dishonest. The poststructuralist valorization of multiplicity,
however, stands in an uneasy relation to psychological work on trauma
which claims to locate the specific, historical causes of the incoherent
self (in an experience of sexual abuse, for example) and points to the
overdetermined content of the resulting identity fragments of a
"multiple personality." In a critique of what she sees as the celebratory
tendency of postructuralist thinking about multiplicity, Lynne Layton
(a feminist therapist) argues that "the pain of th[e] fragmented subject
is forgotten or bracketed [as] she is [... ] figured [in the work of Jacques
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Lacan, Judith Butler, E. Ann Kaplan, Constance Penley, and Kathy
Acker] as able to subvert the system by enjoying, rearranging, and
playing with her fragments" (108). The "fragments" of a "multiple
personality," furthermore, are not contentless but "usually reflect
extreme cultural stereotypes of masculinity and femininity"-the
sadistic and abusive male and the vulnerable and compliant little girl
(112-13). Layton's move to confront poststructuralist theory with
"pain"-with "what it feels like to experience fragmentation" (109)-
replays an unnecessary opposition of "theory" and "raw experience."
The therapist's posture of empathy for those in pain also entails a
normative diagnosis of their "gender identity conflict[s]" and the
"atypicality" of their waking fantasies (113, 116). Nevertheless, by
putting poststructuralist thinking in contact with therapeutic
understandings of "multiple personality" and the defensive, rather
than transformative, uses of fragmentation in practices of self-
representation, Layton points to the remainder of anguish left behind
by theory's figurative fragmentations, as well as by the kind of
argument which only goes so far as to point out (rightly) that the
"disorder" in question is a medico-psychiatric construct. Perhaps we
do not have to (cannot, in fact) choose between explanatory models
privileging constitutive violence and those privileging traumas
locatable in individual life narratives. What if, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick
suggests, we "assume for a moment the near-inevitability of any child's
being 'seduced' in the sense of being inducted into, and more or less
implanted with, one or more adult sexualities whose congruence with
the child's felt desires will necessarily leave at least many painful gaps"
(64)?
That the experience of non-identity is neither one of illness nor
freedom, that individual agency is not the opposite of subjection, but
rather conditional upon some submission to power-these are the sorts
of openings which become possible when the "violation" model is
questioned in a form of analysis that does not simply bracket anguish.
Judith Butler's move to extend the widely circulating theme of the
child's fundamental vulnerability to subordination and exploitation, to
a consideration of how adult subjects are regulated through their
desires and attachments in repetitions of that early vulnerability, is
predicated on a refusal of the terms of the debate about child sexual
abuse. This debate, she argues, "tend[s] to mistake the character of the
exploitation. It is not simply that a sexuality is unilaterally imposed by
the adult, nor that a sexuality is unilaterally fantasized by the child, but
that the child's love, a love that is necessary for its existence, is
exploited and a passionate attachment abused" (7-8). Butler goes on to
propose that the subject achieves its emergence as such only by
denying its primary dependency, its existence at the mercy of others
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upon whom it is "passionately attached." The denial of this early,
necessary submission condemns the subject to neurotically seek out
repeated relations of subjection. But out of this denial and re-enactment
of a primary submission to power comes agency. When we seek social
recognition in an attempt to oppose subordination, for example, we
reiterate that primary, necessary subjection, by identifying with
"indifferent and dominant" categories (20). The small opening in this
picture, considerably smaller than the final"getting free" promised by
recovery programmes, is the possibility of risking a bit of social
"death" (non-recognition) in one's modalities of repetition and in the
forms of self-reflexivity through which one internalizes social norms.2
3.a. To get back, or find again (one who has been
lost or absent). b. To bring, draw, or win back (a
person) to friendship or willing obedience; to
reconcile. c. To recapture, get hold of (an escaped
person) again. 4. To get in place of, or in return
for, something else. 5. Law. a. To get back or gain
by judgement in a court of law; to obtain
possession of, or a right to, by legal process. b. To
have (a judgement or verdict) given in one's
favour. 6. a. To get or obtain; to get hold of.
For Freud, what distinguished the traumatic neurosis from other
neuroses was the immediacy and literality of the dreams and
flashbacks in which the event returned to haunt the subject. The
traumatized person thus"carries an impossible history," a collapse of
witnessing and understanding which can only be reconstructed
through another's ability to "listen to departure" (Caruth 1991a 4,11).
Cathy Caruth stresses the impossibility of a narrativization or
translation of traumatic experience into comprehensibility, into what is
already understandable (1991b 420), but the questions of who listens to
such attempts at narrativization, to what end, and of how received
cultural forms of "listening" shape what is said in the first place, must
be asked nevertheless. What is "recovered" when a traumatized
subject is restored to social normality? This issue relates to the
transitive (rather than reflexive) sense of recovery, as an action
performed on an other.3 How does a society "represen[t] return to the
survivor, [... ] stipulate the conditions of renorinalization and pursu[e]
its own interest in that act of stipulation" (Breitweiser 128)? The
language of clinical psychology, as Mitchell Robert Breitweiser points
out, "tends to establish reunion as an indubitable value, and therefore
to consign the survivor's resistance to categories of the 'psychological,'
the traumatized, the mentally ill, at which point noncompliance is a
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pitiable derangement rather than a critical reflection on the renewed
world" (128).4 It is important, then, to consider the rhetoric of recovery
and self-help as practical technologies aiming at particular outcomes,
as human technologies which both capacitate and govern human
conduct, "combining persons, truths, judgments, devices and actions
into a stable, reproducible, and durable form" (Rose 26-27, 88).
11. refl. 16.a. To regain one's natural position or
balance. b. To return to life or consciousness. c. To
get over a loss or misfortune; to recoup oneself. d.
To get over fatigue or illness.
It is with the reflexive sense of recovery-as in, recovering one's
own deepest core, true self, inner child-that we arrive at the
historically-contingent types of interiority or self-relation which we are
now encouraged to produce and maintain. Nikolas Rose argues that
the psychological-psychiatric disciplines have come to play a
constitutive role in our current subjectification or "infolding" of an
"ontology" with pre-given characteristics. The "human" aspect which
this "psy ontology" presupposes is the desire for self-realization,
which it imposes as a practice of subjectivity that entails a continual self-
monitoring in relation to a regulatory ideal offreedom. This ideal, Rose
argues, "imposes as many burdens, anxieties, and divisions as it
inspires projects of emancipation, and in [its] name [... ] we have come
to authorize so many authorities to assist us in the project of being free
from any authority but our own": social workers, therapists, guidance
counsellors, managers, organizational consultants, and self-help
experts, to name just a few (197). Perhaps the most widespread
technique elaborated in relation to this particular"ontology" is what
Barbara Cruikshank calls the "literary technology" of self-esteem (329).
Self-esteem programmes produce selves through "the telling and
writing of personal narratives" which "bring people to see that the
details of their personal lives and their chances for improving [... ] are
inextricably linked to what is good for all of society" (329). The most
intimate self-expression and -evaluation takes place, in such practices,
in relation to received social norms and goals. The ideally self-
esteeming subject thus governs herself "for the good of society" in
place of the police, the courts, the doctors.
17. a. To retreat, retire into a place; to fall back on
one as an authority. b. To withdraw or escapefrom
or out of, to return to, a position, state or condition.
In I'm Dysfunctional, You're Dysfunctional, Wendy Kraminer
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describes a letter-writing exercise which she observed in the course of
her infiltration of the self-help and recovery movements:
She concludes the workshop by having people write
love letters to themselves, or, rather, to their inner
children. After ten minutes or so of silent writing,
people share their letters, reading them out loud to the
group. Women are crying, reading letters to their
inner kids, like this: "Dear Honey-bunch, I love your
wide-eyed innocence. I have to get to know you
better." Or "Sweetheart, I am very happy that I have
begun to know you. You have been lost to me for such
a long time. I'm looking forward to your teaching me
how to play." A few use the language of romance
novels: "Your passion sets me on fire," they say to
themselves. (97)
At what price do women identify themselves in relation to an
experience which blocked the realization of inner potential and which
gave birth to a small, wounded being inside the self, a being waiting for
recovery? At what price do they speak the truth about themselves as
codependents, addicts, hurt children, victims of a single vector of
oppression who are in the process of healing, once and for all? What is
at stake in an identification with the subject-position of "inner child"?
The composition of letters to an inner addressee is a form of address
which makes the romance an intrasubjective speech genre, enlisting the
convention of fascination with and idealization of the other in the
service of a renewed attachment to self. It asks subjects to imagine a
split within themselves, a split that is based on the generational
difference between an earlier, lost self and the present, adult self,
articulated with an opposition of truth and falsity. The attraction of
such a tropological move may be its potential to anaesthetize the
subject against the pain of being constituted across a number of
historically-produced and sometimes contradictory material sites.
Radically simplifying and internalizing difference and encoding it in
terms of such a binary, it promises a permanent freedom from pain and
adversity, an arrival "home" to an identity that can be fully and finally
inhabited. This promise of a home, as Biddy Martin and Chandra
Talpade Mohanty have argued, can only be fulfilled through "the
exclusion of specific histories of oppression and resistance and the
repression of differences even within oneself" (qtd in de Lauretis 135).5
But the differences within the self that are part of every personal
history-the product of geographical, social, political, intellectual
dislocations-are here reduced to the difference between adulthood
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and childhood, a difference which overlays the complex interactions
between the subject and the social with the comforting privacy of
familial relations. Whereas the trope of travel in this discourse refers to
an "inward voyaging, " a "journey back to a lost child" (Steinem 160-
61), back home to a truth constructed as pre-existent and interior, in an
alternate usage of this trope, travel might refer to an intellectual
displacement between truths produced in different relations of power
and knowledge. This would be a journey from one way of
apprehending the world to another, a form of travel that would also
reconfigure the relation to the self.
Notes
Many thanks to Julie Murray for her comments on a draft of this essay.
1 I follow Pamela Haag's periodization of twentieth-century North American
feminisms here, as well as her characterization of the "third wave," which, she
argues, emerges with the social practices on university and college campuses in the
1980s, organized by women who came of age when the feminist analysis of violence
had already contracted into a focus on the singularity of "violation" (60).
2 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, more concerned with the technical side of negotiating
with the "enabling violence" of inherited political languages and regimes of signs
tied to particular organizations of power, describes this risk-taking in terms of
"realiz[ing] the responsibility of playing with or working with fire [rather] than
pretend[ing] that what gives light and warmth does not also destroy" (283). Spivak
is discussing the "idiom of constitutions" in relation to the teaching of "woman's
history" and transnational culture studies in the university, but her warnings about
the effects of a constitutional law coding of women's bodies, "this defining of
ourselves into part of a General Will by way of articles of 'foreign'-that is to say
gender-alienated manufacture" (284)-seems relevant here. What these conditions
require is a "persistent critique" of those structures"one cannot not (wish to)
inhabit" (284).
3 The legal definition of recovery, the recuperation of a debt through a recourse to the
authority of law, suggests that something is being paid out in the narrativization of
trauma, and that that self-narrativization, furthermore, occurs from a position of
indebtedness. I find it fascinating that Canada's best-known female captivity
narratives-the first-person accounts of trauma by Theresa Gowanlock and Theresa
Delaney, captured during the North-West rebellion-present themselves as
repayments of a debt to the nation.
4 Breitweiser is criticizing a "symptomatic" reading of the seventeenth-century
captivity narrative of Mary Rowlandson in terms of the late-twentieth century
"survivor syndrome," a reading which, he argues, only repeats "in the mode of
therapeutic solicitousness" the Puritan typological exiling of excessive significances
to the wilderness of irrationality (127-29).
5 de Lauretis proposes a mode of feminist theorizing that would "begin when the
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feminist critique of socio-cultural formations (discourses, forms of representation,
ideologies) becomes conscious of itself and turns inward... in pursuit of
consciousness-to question its own relation to or possible complicity with those
ideologies, its own heterogeneous body of writing and interpretations, their basic
assumptions and terms, and the practices which they enable and from which they
emerge" (138).
Works Cited
Breitweiser, Mitchell Robert. American Puritanism and the Defense of
Mourning: Religion, Grief and Ethnology in Mary White
Rowlandson's Captivity Narrative. Madison, WS: U of
Wisconsin P, 1991.
Butler, Judith. The Psychic Life ofPower: Theories in Subjection. Stanford:
Stanford UP, 1997.
Caruth, Cathy. "Introduction." Psychoanalysis, Culture and Trauma:
I. American Imago 48.1 (Spring 1991): 1-11.
----. "Introduction." Psychoanalysis, Culture and Trauma: H.
American Imago 48.4 (Winter 1991): 417-24.
Cruikshank, Barbara. "Revolutions within: self-government and self-
esteem." Economy and Society 22.3 (August 1993): 327-44.
de Lauretis, Teresa. "Eccentric Subjects: Feminist Theory and
Historical Consciousness." Feminist Studies 16.1 (Spring 1990):
115-50.
Gowanlock, Theresa and Theresa Delaney. Two Months in the Camp of
Big Bear: The Life and Adventures ofTheresa Gowanlock and
Theresa Delaney. Parkdale: Times Office, 1885.
Haag, Pamela. "'Putting Your Body on the Line': The Question of
Violence, Victims, and the Legacies of Second-Wave
Feminism." differences 8.2 (1996): 23-67.
Kraminer, Wendy. I'm Dysfunctional, You're Dysfunctional: The
Recovery Movement and Other Self-Help Fashions. Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley,1992.
Laframboise, Donna. The Princess at the Window: A New Gender
Morality. Toronto: Penguin, 1996.
Layton, Lynne. "Trauma, Gender Identity and Sexuality: Discourses
of Fragmentation." American Imago 52.1 (1995): 107-125.
Paglia, Camille. Sexual Personae. New Haven: Yale UP, 1990.
Rose, Nikolas. Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.
Scott, Gail. Main Brides. Toronto: Coach House, 1993.
· 15
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. "Tales of the Avunculate: Queer Tutelage in
The Importance ofBeing Earnest." Tendencies. Duke UP, 1993:
52-72.
Simpson, J. A. and E. S. C. Weiner. The Oxford English Dictionary.
Second Edition. Vo!. XIII. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989:
367-68.
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. "Scattered Speculations on the Question
of Culture Studies." Outside in the Teaching Machine. New
York: Routledge,1993: 255-84.
Steinem, Gloria. The Revolution From Within: A Book ofSelf-Esteem.
Boston: Little Brown, 1992.

